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It is widely recognized that the expansion of UN peacekeeping missions since 
1988 has outpaced the organizational capacity of the United Nations to 
properly plan for, manage, and support the complex military and civil 
operations now being conducted around the world. When there were only a few 
operations going at anyone time and no new missions were being initiated (as 
in the period between 1978 and 1988), the ad hoc planning and supervision 
conducted by the peacekeeping staff within the UN Secretariat seemed 
adequate. The present situation is, however, quite different and there is 
increasing debate about the conduct of such operations. The number of UN 
peacekeepers in the seventeen missions is well over 80,000 personnell and the 
annual UN peacekeeping budget adds up to almost three billion US dollars. It 
is clear that substantial changes in how we manage these demanding 
enterprises are needed now 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace has provided 
a sound basis for rethinking the UN's approach to peacekeeping. The General 
Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has made a 
number of valuable recommendations to improve the UN management of 
peacekeeping. The following encouraging changes are in progress now: 
I. A UN situation center in New York is now operating on a 24-hour 
basis to maintain communication with the peacekeeping operations in 
the field. 
2. The staff of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DKPO) in the 
UN Secretariat is being expanded with the additional political officers 
and seconded military officers to handle the myriad actions associated 
with the numerous peacekeeping operations. 
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3. DKPO has recruited special advisers to address the areas of training, 
demining, and civil police operations. 
4. The process has begun to identify the requirements for UN standby 
forces, ready on short notice to deploy on peacekeeeping duty, and to 
have nations earmark military units for this purpose. 
5. A common UN logistics doctrine for peacekeeping operations is being 
developed. 
6. The Field Operations Division, responsible for the personnellogistical, 
and financial administration of peacekeeping operations, is to be 
integrated into DKPO, permitting a long-awaited unity of effort. 
7. A policy planning cell will be established in DKPO to address general 
peacekeeping policy, as well as the emerging crises to which the UN 
may need to respond. 
8. Initial arrangements are being made for DKPO to receive intelligence 
information about ongoing or potential peacekeeping missions, from nations 
with appropriate resources. 
All these actions are to be strongly commended; however, we must recognize 
that these changes are the minimum first steps to improve the system. To 
enable the UN to truly meet the challenges of peacekeeping as· we enter the 
21 st century, I propose four further improvements to the way we plan, conduct, 
and manage the 'peace' missions which employ military and civil resources to 
achieve important political objectives. Our goal should be to make peace-
keeping operations as profesional and competent as the best military operations 
of a national armed force. The four actions are: the strengthening of the role of 
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to the Military Adviser to serve as the UN's Peacekeeping IG. To ensure a high 
degree of independence and objectivity, it would be preferred that, like the 
Military Adviser, the IG be a retired military officer, desirably a general officer 
with extensive peacekeeping experience. The IG would be assisted by two 
deputy IGs, one military, in the ~ank of colonel and possibly a retired officer 
as well, and one civilian of equivalant rank from the Secretariat staff, both with 
solid peacekeeping background: They would be supported by a staff of six 
assistants, four active duty military officers, of the rank ofmajor or lieutanant 
colonel, seconded from their nations for three-year tours, and two civilians of 
equivalent rank from the professional staff of the secretariat. All of the assistant 
IGs would also require on-tRe-ground peacekeeping experience as a 
prerequisite. 
The IG and his staff would be responsible for the monitoring of 
standards in training, operations, logistics, administration, and organization for 
peacekeeping forces and for ensuring the continuing relevance of the standards 
to the ongoing and potential operations. The designated standards would have 
to be met before a unit or personnel would be permitted to deploy on a 
peacekeeping mission. Naturally these standards would have to be described 
in some specificity in documents distributed to all member states. 
The actual conduct of inspections could be accomplished in a fairly 
simple manner. The assistant IGs would be assigned specific responsibility for 
a group of nations which are currently providing forces for peacekeeping or 
which have identified themselves as probable contributors to future missions. 
The assistants would develop a schedule of announced inspections to be 
conducted on units due to replace existing formations in peacekeeping 
operations, as well as those earmarked for standby peacekeeping duty. The 
Military Adviser, the IG, or a deputy IG would lead each inspection team, 
supported by the responsible assistant IG and two or three qualified persons, 
military or civilians, drawn on a temporary basis from the troop contributing 
nations. No team member would participate in an inspection of his own nation's 
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forces. Such inspections would normally take three our four days and would be 
timed to allow correction of identified problems before deployment. They 
would involve checks of unit equipment, testing of troop knowledge of critical 
subjects, such as rules of engagement, performance of a short peacekeeping 
field exercise, and discussions with the unit leadership. The team would not be 
limited to checking military elements, but would also look at the preparation 
of civilian contingents, such as civil police detachments and medical teams, to 
be posted to a peacekeeping mission. 
The logical extension of the inspector general function would be the 
addition of a similar staff element in the headquarters of each peacekeeping 
organization, to act on behalf of the force commander or civilian head of 
mission to check on the maintenance of standards by the staff as well as the 
contingents while in the mission area. Where there might be the possibility of 
serious misconduct or mismanagement by peacekeeping personnel, the IG 
might be called upon to lead an investigation by a special team of experts 
drawn from the UN Secretariat or several nations to inspect records, interview 
witnesses, and provide a formal report to the Under Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations. The advantage of a team from outside the mission 
area would be objectivity, especially important if there may have been friction 
between a particular national contingent and force headquarters. 
Standby Force Headquarters 
To adequately support the concept of UN standby forces ready to deploy on 
short notice for peacekeeping missions, I recommend the establishment of a 
multinational standby force headquarters. This element would be available to 
command the standby forces and be prepared for worldwide operations with an 
advance team able to depart within 72 hours of notification. Having forces on 
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standby for an urgent crisis without creating a similarly responsive 
headquarters is completely illogical. 
The standby force headquarters would have to be "lean" and capable. 
It would provide the "skelton" on which would eventually be built a full-size 
force staff, tailored to the particular requirements of a mission. It should consist 
of a full-time cell of 15 personnel within the office of the Military Adviser plus 
an on-call group of up to 1 00 experienced military and civilian personnel, from 
within the UN Secretariat or nominated ny nations. These persons would be 
selected based on their specific abilities to perform the principal staff functions 
and other likely activities associated with potential peacekeeping operations. 
The UN Secretariat would maintain a list of qualified force com-
manders, ready to fill in at the top of this standby headquarters and familiar 
with its procedures. Among the full-time members of this element would be a 
military officer designated as the interim chief of staff of the deploying 
headquarters and a political officer nominated as the interim civil deputy to the 
force commander. 
All personnel would have to be available for worldwide deployment of 
up to six-months on new peacekeeping missions. There would be a system of 
rotating, incremental alert status for the headquarters personnel with one-third 
of the personnel on a 72-hours' notice for movement (the advance team), 
another third on a seven-day alert (the center team), and the remainder ready 
within two weeks (the rear team). Every month individuals would rotate as a 
group to another alert posture. 
The day-to-day supervision of the standby force headquarters would be 
the responsibility of a staff cell within the office of the Military Adviser, led 
by a military officer, probably in the rank of colonel. He would have both a 
military and a civilian deputy, as well as a staff of 12 military and civilian 
officers with solid peacekeeping experience. The cell would provide the key 
elements of the standby headquarters and would conduct visits to operational . 
force headquarters around the world to ensure. their· familiarity with the 
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problems encountered in the ongoing missions. The cell would also maintain 
accountability of personnel assigned to the headquarters. At least twice a year 
they would conduct a call-out exercise on short notice to bring together most 
of the personnel of the standby headquarters to simulate the establishment of 
a new peacekeeping mission. In addition all members of the standby 
headquarters would be required to spend a week each year performing similar 
duties in a current peacekeeping operation. For their standby service those in 
the on-call group would receive an appropriate compensation, either from their 
nation or the United Nations. 
The communications and support of the standby headquarters will 
present some challenges. The list of standbye forces will include com-
munications units necessary for a force headquarters to command its 
subordinate formations and to stay in contact with UN Headquarters in New 
York. However, some of these units may not be immediately available. The 
solution would be the procurement of several sets of commercially available, 
portable satelite communications radios to be operated by members of the 
advance team of the standby headquarters. The radio operators would come 
from the on-call group of the standby headquarters, drawn from nations or from 
the personnel of the UN situation room. The headquarters would also have to 
have a set of basic staff supplies and equipment prepared for air shipment on 
short notice, with optional add-on packages to support operations in particular 
climatic conditions. Some four-wheel drive vehicles would be ready to be 
moved by air, if the ground situation required. 
Conclusions 
The four measures outlined above will naturally have costs that will have to be 
paid by the UN, costs for the salaries of additional staff personnel and costs to 
implement several of the programs. In the cost-benefit analysis the concerned 
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member states of the UN, especially the consistently loyal troop contributors, 
should also calculate the costs of not taking these steps, the costs of continuing 
to try to run multibillion operations, where peace is at stake, on shoestring 
budgets. We should not ask any more of our peacekeepers than absolutely 
necessary, when their lives are already in danger. The most important question 
is really whether the UN can afford to not make these changes and not achieve 
a professional standard of competence and excellence in managing these 
critical missions. 
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